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A dramatic infusion of outside money has shaped legal theory over the last several decades,
largely to the detriment of feminist theory. Nonetheless, the pervasive influence of this funding is
largely ignored in scholarly discussions of legal theory. This denial helps reinforce the marginal
position of feminist scholarship and of women in legal theory. Conservative activists and funders
have understood the central role of developing community culture and institutions, and have helped
shift the prevailing framework for discussion of many questions of theory and policy through
substantial investments in law-and-economics centers and in the Federalist Society. Comparing
the institutional resources and structures of support for feminist or gender scholarship to those
developed for economic analysis of law focused on free-market or neoliberal policy and business
interests reveals substantial differences. Further, much of this conservative institution building has
been dominated by men and has served to promote legal scholarship by white men in particular. I
conclude by considering how feminist legal scholarship might better develop institutional support
despite access to much less money.
KEYWORDS: legal theory, jurisprudence, law and economics, Olin foundation, feminism, fem-
inist legal theory, Federalist Society, critical legal studies, critical race theory, Cass Sunstein,
Richard Posner, gender, law schools
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In the last several decades, feminist legal theory has flourished as one of a 
number of schools of thought reexamining law’s basic principles, methods, and 
social functions.1   Courses, scholarship, journals, and advocacy focused on 
feminism have become an established part of the legal landscape.  Despite these 
accomplishments, however, feminism’s place within theory, practice, and 
teaching remains largely marginal and subordinate.    
 In contrast, Law and Economics has emerged from among these recent 
movements as a powerful, if not dominant force in U.S. legal theory, teaching and 
policy.  The overlapping, but more explicitly conservative Federalist Society has 
grown from an outpost for radical views to an inside power broker reshaping 
much of the U.S. legal profession, judiciary, government and legal academia.   
 One important reason for these different outcomes is that the intellectual 
energy and reach of feminist legal theory has not been matched with the material 
and institutional support available to other recent movements.  Feminism gained 
its foothold in law just as legal academia, theory, and law reform became a major 
focus for economic investment and organizing by conservative activists in the 
United States.2   Compared to other countries, the distinctive strength of 
conservative legal movements like Law and Economics in the U.S. matches the 
distinctive economic support for those movements here.  
 Feminist entrepreneurship, energy and intellectual power has helped to 
sustain feminist scholarship in the face of this enormous infusion of money to 
marginalize or oppose egalitarian legal ideas.  Nonetheless, to move forward 
effectively, feminist legal theory will need not only to continue its creative, 
rigorous, and bold analysis of law and gender, but also to step up its efforts to 
strategically mobilize and nurture the institutional and material resources vital to 
being heard, engaged, and implemented.  
 
I.  Presuming a Non-Material World of Legal Theory 
 
Legal theory is not only a market of competing ideas, but a market in which ideas 
are bought, sold, and targeted for investment to procure political and economic 
gain.   Yet the economics of legal theory barely surfaces in polite scholarly 
conversation.   Understanding feminist legal theory’s current and future 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, ED., TRANSCENDING THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW: 
GENERATIONS OF FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY (2010) (collecting essays reflecting on the 
development and future of feminist legal scholarship after twenty-five years of the Feminism and 
Legal Theory Project). The prolific and passionate “feminist law professors “ blog, for example, 
lists more than  200 affiliated law faculty.  See Feminist Law Professors, 
www.feministlawprofessors.com (last visited June 23, 2010).   
2 STEVEN TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL 
OF THE LAW (2008). 
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challenges requires digging deeper into the question of how money shapes the 
success and substance of competing legal theories.  
 Scholarly discussion of this recent rise and fall of diverse legal theories 
has tended to focus mainly on the relative intellectual strengths of the ideas, such 
as their originality, rigor, or usefulness for policy and legal practice.  Questions of 
“failures” and “distortions” in the “market for ideas” often focus on individual 
scholars’ intellectual and moral imperfections, or on the ways in which individual 
scholarly choices are based on emotional factors, imperfect information, or social 
approval.   
  Answering the question why Critical Legal Studies “disappear[ed],” while 
Law and Economics and the Federalist Society have prospered, prominent legal 
scholar (and federal “regulatory czar”) Cass Sunstein explains that the “market” 
for legal theory can be skewed by “fads, fashions, and bandwagon effects.”3  He 
describes how ideas about good legal theory get shaped by irrational and 
unintended “cascade effects” such as habit, reputational pressures, imperfect 
information, mass psychology and emotional ties.  For example, he notes that 
feminism succeeded in the mid-1980s because of an “informational cascade” 
whereby skeptics who had not themselves carefully investigated the truth of 
feminism’s underlying claims came to nonetheless accept feminist legal theory as 
valuable mainly because many others thought so.4   He describes a similar 
phenomenon with the contemporary predominance of Law and Economics at the 
University of Chicago, where the simple fact of ubiquitous exposure steers new 
faculty and students to a particular version of economic thinking.5  Sunstein 
observes that it takes confidence for any individual scholar to assert her own 
skepticism in the face of prevailing trends.6   
 In this examination of psychological and discursive digressions from 
intellectual merit, Sunstein stops short of considering the distorting influence of 
money and institutional resources.  He does acknowledge that individual scholars 
reasonably depend on reputation and other non-intellectual influences in choosing 
their ideas and arguments.7   He also notes that “external shocks... outside of the 
[legal] academic domain” have a role in stopping or starting intellectual 
bandwagons, acknowledging that legal theory responds to market “demand” not 
just from other law scholars but from a broader set of consumers.8  Yet he limits 
his view of these external influences on legal scholarship to changes in the federal 
                                                 
3 Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword, On Academic Fads and Fashions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1251, 1251 
(2001).  
4 Id. at 1255. 
5 Id.  at 1256. 
6 Id. at 1255.  
7 Id. at 1257.  
8 Id. at 1253.  
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judiciary, hot-button political issues, and trends in other academic disciplines.9  
He identifies the “consumers” whose demand influences the supply of legal 
theory as those with largely professional rather than overtly financial or political 
interests or agendas:  “other academics, students, government officials, judges, 
and law clerks,”10 not (for example) business interests, upper class interests, 
ideologically-oriented foundations and think tanks, or conservative activists. 
  This vision of a “market” for theory mostly removed from direct material 
interests and political power is particularly striking in a contemporary 
jurisprudential context in which it is standard scholarly fare to critique the 
economic interests beneath righteously defended principle, thanks to the success 
of Law and Economics. Indeed, Judge Richard Posner, a founding figure of Law 
and Economics, has dismissed as “extreme” and absurd the idea that this 
movement’s success rested on lavish funding by conservative foundations rather 
than on intellectual merit, or that other movements’ relative weakness is related to 
lack of foundation funding.11   To support this sweeping claim, Posner asserts that 
“[f]oundation or government grants are indeed vital in many areas of natural 
science and some areas of social science, but they are not vital to research 
conducted in law schools or to purely theoretical investigations by economists.”12  
 Sunstein similarly distinguishes what he sees as the non-material interests 
driving the market for legal theory from typical markets, noting that “no one pays 
directly for what academics produce.”13  He explains that the journals that publish 
law scholarship “usually do not compensate contributors for articles and 
essays,”14 and though authors may be paid for books, “little money is usually 
involved.”15  Nonetheless, Sunstein acknowledges that “indirect compensation – 
monetary and nonmonetary—is omnipresent.”16 He acknowledges that job 
opportunities and (in part) salary directly depend on scholarly output.17   But he 
quickly glosses over these direct material incentives to emphasize the importance 
of invitations to scholarly events as the primary kind of non-intellectual factor that 
“disciplines academic activity.”18 He treats these influences as social and 
psychological phenomena that can skew the production of ideas away from pure 
                                                 
9 Id. at 1261-63. 
10 Id. at 1253. 
11 Richard A. Posner, Comment on Lempert on Posner, 87 VA. L. REV. 1713, 1714-15 (2001). 
Posner appears to take a somewhat different view of the significance of money in scholarship 
elsewhere, however.  See infra note 35 and accompanying text.  
12 Posner, supra note 11, at 1715.  
13 Sunstein, supra note  3, at 1253. 
14 Id.  
15 Id. at 1254.  
16 Id.  
17 Id. 
18 Id.  
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merit, even though tenure and other academic structures may insulate ideas from 
outside material pressures.19    
 This non-material picture of the question of biases in legal theory begs 
three questions.   First, it leaves unanalyzed the extent to which money actually 
does directly shape the production of contemporary legal scholarship.  Second, it 
fails to examine the ways in which the omnipresence of indirect material 
influences on legal scholarship have constrained and controlled ideas about law.   
Third, this analysis suggests that the biases in the “market” for legal theory are 
ideologically and economically neutral or random, because it abstracts the biases 
in this “market” from larger socioeconomic structures and power inequalities.  
Sunstein portrays feminism, critical legal theory and Law and Economics as 
seemingly equal examples of how legal theories occasionally benefit from 
reputational biases,20 without comparing the depth, breadth, interrelationships and 
nature of the impact of non-intellectual factors on these different schools of 
thought.  By situating the market for legal theory in the broader socioeconomic 
context, we can better see how the non-intellectual influences on theory are 
instead systemically and dramatically skewed against feminist legal theory (and 
other egalitarian legal theories) and in favor of Law and Economics and other 
conservative movements.   
 Not only does this standard picture of competing legal theories stop short 
of intellectual engagement with questions of the material influence, but it also 
risks contributing to an academic culture in which those questions are outside the 
bounds of intellectual inquiry.  As Sunstein’s discussion of reputation in 
scholarship explains, if prominent scholars repeatedly and systematically dismiss 
questions of monetary influence as absurd, and if these questions are treated as 
crass personal attacks rather invitations to sophisticated analysis, serious 
intellectual evaluation of the issue is likely to be deterred.  
 
II.  Outside Funding for Scholarship 
  
The vast inequalities of money in legal theory probably have skewed many 
scholars’ choices away from focusing on gender and toward interests and 
ideologies likely to undermine feminist perspectives and goals.  In addition, this 
lack of outside funding means that feminist legal scholarship is likely to get less 
attention, prestige, and distribution than more well-funded schools of thought.  
 
                                                 
19 Id.  
20 Id. at 1255-56. 
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 A. Directly Funding Legal Scholarship for Economic and Political Gain 
  
     1.   Money for production, publication, and distribution of legal  
 scholarship 
  
Although, as Posner and Sunstein observe, most scholarship in law reviews is 
funded generally by law faculty salaries,21 direct payment for individual research 
and publication from outside groups with material interests in the subject matter is 
a significant and probably growing trend.   A 2008 study of law review articles in 
the Westlaw database found about 12,000 (out of 441,170 total) that explicitly 
acknowledged funding by government, industry or interest groups.22   Outside 
funding for scholarship from business and advocacy groups is particularly likely 
to differ from typical grants from general university or government research funds 
by being orchestrated to advance specific ideologies or interests.  
 In one widely discussed example of hired scholarship, Exxon Corporation 
extensively funded research and publications critical of punitive damages during 
its protracted appeal of a multibillion dollar punitive damage award for the Valdez 
oil spill.23  Indeed, Sunstein was one of several law scholars who acknowledge 
receiving an unspecified amount of Exxon’s largess for scholarship useful to 
those supporting restrictions on jurors’ punitive damage awards.24  Even though 
the Supreme Court claimed to discount the Exxon-funded research,25 this 
scholarship has been highly influential in promoting opposition to punitive 
damages in policy, litigation, and academic discussions.26    
 Funds for recruiting and developing legal scholarship to support specific 
litigation or policy results have been provided not just by individual businesses, 
but also by advocacy groups or foundations with missions and funding explicitly 
linked to the interests of large corporations.  One example is the Pacific Legal 
Foundation, a national “public interest” litigation firm that describes its mission as 
promoting “limited government, property rights, individual rights and a balanced 
                                                 
21 See supra notes 11, 12, & 13 & accompanying text. 
22Shireen A. Barday, Punitive Damages, Remunerated Research, and the Legal Profession, 61 
STAN. L. REV. 711, 713 & n. 5 (2008).  
23 See Deborah Rhode, The Professional Ethics of Professors, 56 J. OF LEGAL EDUCATION 70, 76 
(2006) (citing Alan Zarembo, Funding Studies to Suit Need, L.A. TIMES, Dec.3, 2003, at A1).   
24 See Barday, supra note 22, at 720; Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, and David Schkade, 
Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law),107 YALE L.J. 2071 
(1998); Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, & Daniel Kahneman, Do People Want Optimal 
Deterrence? 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 237 (2000);CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW 
JURIES DECIDE ix (2002). 
25 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S.Ct. 2605, 2626 n.17 (2008). 
26 See Barday, supra note 22, at 734, Appendix A (listing judicial citations). 
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approach to environmental protection.”27  This organization provides up to four 
grants of $10,000 a year to U.S. law faculty for production of scholarly articles 
advancing that group’s litigation interests.28    
 In addition to funding individual publications by law school faculty, an 
extensive network of well-funded conservative think tanks provides substantial 
financial support for in-house staff to produce legal scholarship.   For example, 
the Pacific Legal Foundation’s web site includes a bibliography of “sponsored 
scholarship,” much of which has been produced by in-house attorneys.29  Other 
prominent examples include the American Enterprise Institute (listing over 
seventy-five staff scholars, including paid positions for resident or visiting 
scholars and doctoral student fellowships)30; the Cato Institute (listing over fifty 
“policy scholars” on staff)31  and the Independence Institute (listing fourteen 
scholars on staff)32. Taken as a group, scholars working for these advocacy-
oriented organizations have developed an extensive body of work in law reviews 
and other academic sources promoting not just only particular policy positions, 
but also certain strands of legal theory.   
 Does this targeted funding matter to the direction and success of legal 
theory, given that individual legal scholars are likely motivated by a range of 
factors other than direct economic gain (such as concern for truth, justice, or 
intellectual rigor and prestige)?   In the case of punitive damages scholarship, 
funding source strongly predicts substantive position: university and government 
funded scholarship overwhelmingly defended punitive damages awards, while 
scholarship funded by business interests or business-oriented foundations (not 
surprisingly) provided support for corporate defendants’ efforts to reduce punitive 
damage awards.33     
 The problem is not simply that outcome-oriented funding induces 
academics to produce substandard, incorrect or fraudulent evidence and analysis.  
Even when the funders do not improperly influence the process or results of the 
research, and even when the research and analysis is reasonable, the presence of 
outside funding steers scholarship toward particular questions and information 
useful to particular interests while ignoring competing concerns and evidence.  
                                                 
27 Pacific Legal Foundation:  Rescuing Liberty from Coast to Coast, About PLF, 
http://www.pacificlegal.org/page.aspx?pid=262  (last visited Aug. 12, 2011).  
28 Pacific Legal Foundation, Legal Scholarship:  Faculty Grants, 
http://www.pacificlegal.org/page.aspx?pid=346 (last visited Aug. 12, 2011). 
29 Pacific Legal Foundation, Legal Scholarship:  Bibliography of Sponsored Scholarship,  
http://www.pacificlegal.org/page.aspx?pid=347  (last visited Aug. 12, 2011). 
30 American Enterprise Institute, Contact List of Scholars and Fellows,  
http://www.aei.org/scholars  (last visited June 23, 2010). 
31Cato Institute; Experts, http://www.cato.org/people/experts.html (last visited June 23, 2010).  
32Independence Institute, Staff,  http://www.i2i.org/staff.php (last visited Aug. 9, 2010). 
33 Barday, supra note 22, at  720 n.33. 
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This steering of information production is especially problematic given a 
socioeconomic context of highly unequal resources for private production of 
knowledge.   
 The current lack of transparency about the amount or manner of outside 
funding of legal scholarship heightens concerns about the possible impact of 
direct payments for scholarship on the substance of individual scholar’s work. 
Although the AALS has a “statement of good practice” directing law faculty to 
footnote the fact of outside funding for any article submitted to law reviews for 
publication, no system has been established by the AALS, law schools, or law 
reviews for enforcing this vague guideline, and this guideline fails to specify 
disclosure of the amount of the funding or the relationship of the funding to the 
publication’s content.34  Judge Posner (writing about the decline of public 
intellectuals) has criticized the failure of scholars writing industry-funded 
scholarship to disclose the amount of their remuneration, and reports that the law 
scholar most often funded by Exxon compared his remuneration to typical 
economic consulting fees that Posner estimated at around $1,000 an hour.35  
Whatever their other motives, academics are unlikely to be completely immune 
from the influence of money, especially at such lavish rates of compensation. 
 Outside funding targeted to specific outcomes is likely to shape legal 
theory and practice not only through the incentive effects of direct renumeration 
but also through the impact of funding on nonmonetary rewards such as media 
attention and academic prestige.  Business interests or advocacy groups that pay 
for production of scholarship also are likely to distribute that scholarship to their 
lawyers for use in litigation36 as well as to lobbyists, policymakers, the media, and 
other academics (particularly though academic centers and organizations 
supported by the same funders).  This “marketing” can help build recognition 
increasing legal scholars’ professional status (particularly when it leads to judicial 
citation and invitations to academic events), contributing to benefits such as 
higher salaries, job mobility and advancement, and more support for scholarship 
as well as further outside funding for research or consulting.37  This connection 
                                                 
34 See Barday; supra note 22, at 732 & n.93. 
35 RICHARD A. POSNER, PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS:  A STUDY OF DECLINE  394-95 (2003). One legal 
scholar who has advocated for tougher disclosure requirements, Susan B. Koniak, reported that 
she earned $50,000 for serving as an expert witness over a period of two years in an asbestos class 
action case. Richard Lippitt, Intellectual Honesty, Industry and Interest Sponsored Professorial 
Works, and Full Disclosure: Is the Viewpoint Earning the Money, or is the Money Earning the 
Viewpoint?, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 1075, 1083-85 (2001). 
36 Barday, supra note 22, at 722-23. 
37 Writing in 2003 about law professors’ income-earning potential, the author of a prominent legal 
theory blog commented that law professors frequently engage in outside consulting activities for 
pay, with some earning $1,000 an hour and “hundreds” earning in the range of $400 an hour. 
Posting of Brian Leiter, Leiter Reports: A Philosophy Blog (Oct. 11, 2003), 
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with resources for distribution also means “scholarship for hire” is likely to have 
influence well beyond its relatively small numbers.  
 Moreover, the Exxon example suggests that in addition to purchasing 
scholarship based on desired outcomes in specific cases or legislation battles, 
interested industries have sought more far-reaching results by strategically 
advancing the work of selected scholars and theoretical approaches.  An analysis 
of punitive damages scholarship, for example, showed that three prominent law 
professors (including Sunstein) accounted for most of the (acknowledged) funded 
scholarship, with each of the three receiving funding from Exxon for more than 
one publication, and with each already a leading figure in promoting economic 
analysis of law at an elite law school.38   
 Although feminist legal research and writing projects undoubtedly have 
benefited from general university and government funding, targeted support for 
individual scholarly production of feminist legal theory or work on gender and 
law appears rare.  No industry organizations, foundations, or interest groups 
appear to have systematically funded work by feminist legal scholars comparable 
to the funding of scholarship advancing business interests or free-market 
ideology. Nor have nonacademic feminist legal advocacy groups regularly (if 
ever) offered funding for individual scholarly publications by law faculty. The 
Center for Reproductive Rights (a public interest law firm) recently has initiated 
an award for legal scholarship promoting its goals, and though this award brings 
recognition and opportunities for involvement with the Center, no mention is 
made of any monetary payment (in contrast to the awards offered by the Pacific 
Legal Foundation).39  Unlike conservative advocacy groups, paid opportunities 
for scholarly research  and publication within non-academic feminist advocacy 
organizations appear rare or nonexistent.  Staff of feminist advocacy 
organizations (like the National Women’s Law Center, the National Partnership 
for Women and Families, or the National Organization for Women) tend to 
produce primarily non-academic publications.   
 Looking at the specific subject of tort reform as a leading example of 
money skewing theory, research on gender equity in the civil justice system has 
not received funding for research comparable to scholarship critical of punitive 
damage awards.  In what appears to be an isolated exception, Lucinda Finley 
acknowledges funding from a source related to trial lawyers for her empirical 
research exploring the harmful impact on women of restrictions on non-economic 
                                                                                                                                     
http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2003/10/how_much_money_.html.  
38 See Barday, supra  note 22, at 720 (discussing funded work by A. Mitchell Polinsky, W. Kip 
Viscusi, and Cass R. Sunstein).   
39 See Center for Reproductive Rights:  CRR Innovation in Scholarship Award, 
http://reproductiverights.org/en/project/crr-innovation-in-scholarship-award (last visited Aug. 9, 
2010).  
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damages.40  Nonetheless, outside funders such as trial lawyers or labor unions do 
not seem to have designed their funding to strategically advance and 
institutionalize legal scholarship on gender or feminism, for example by targeting 
prominent feminist scholars for repeated funding or by aiming to advance 
feminist theory more generally.41  
 
 2.  Money for scholarship time and professional development 
 
More important than payment for individual publications, outside money 
selectively supports faculty time for legal scholarship.  General university-
sponsored fellowships freeing faculty from teaching and administrative duties for 
research and writing are relatively rare in legal academia, other than sabbaticals or 
pre-tenure research leaves and occasional course relief by a faculty member’s 
home institution for extraordinary achievement or special projects.  In recent 
years, national rankings and other competitive pressures probably have 
contributed to increased demands on faculty not just for publication, but also for 
increased service to students and for heightened administrative responsibilities 
(such as student and faculty recruitment, fundraising, curricular reform, career 
services, and public relations).  Furthermore, recent budget pressures on 
universities often have decreased academic funding available for scholarship time.  
Think tanks, foundations, law firms, and advocacy groups providing research 
fellowships for scholarship can play an important role in relieving this time 
pressure and advancing academic careers now highly dependent on scholarly 
productivity.   
 Scholarly fellowships by nonacademic funders appear highly skewed 
toward conservative non-feminist research and writing. For example, the 
Federalist Society’s Olin/Searle/Smith Fellows in Law program awards up to 
three fellowships of $50,000 a year plus benefits to give “top young legal thinkers 
the opportunity to spend a year working full time on writing and developing their 
scholarship with the goal of entering the legal academy.”42 In his book The Rise of 
the Conservative Legal Movement, political scientist Steven Teles explains how 
this Fellows program was designed to explicitly promote conservative scholarship 
                                                 
40 Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform:  Women, Children and the Elderly, 53 
EMORY L.J. 1263, 1263 n.a1 (2004) (acknowledging the Robert L. Habush Endowment of the 
Association of American Trial Lawyers).  
41 Tort scholars Martha Chamallas and Jennifer Wriggins, for example, reported they have not 
received any nonacademic funding for their research and publications on gender and race in tort 
law.  Email communications with author,  Feb. 24, 2010; see MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. 
WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER & TORT LAW (2010) (analyzing case law 
showing undercompensation of women and minorities).  
42 The Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies, Olin/Searle Fellows in Law, 
http://www.fed-soc.org/aboutus/id.40/default.asp (last visited Aug. 9, 2010). 
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by those “dedicated to the principles of the rule of law and limited government” 
and to counter control of existing generalized academic fellowships by faculty 
members perceived to lack sufficient right-wing political commitments.43  In 
2009, the Federalist Society reported that two-thirds of recipients of the 
fellowship now hold tenure-track law faculty positions.44  Individual fellowship 
recipients have credited this fellowship with providing networking, knowledge, 
and prestige important to their career direction and success.45    
  In addition, the Federalist Society has recently offered the “Searle Young 
Legal Scholars Research Fellowships,” which replace the academic salaries of 
two tenure-track junior law faculty in order to provide a semester-long research 
leave.46 The Society reports that these fellowships aim not only to increase 
scholarly production by junior faculty at schools with relatively heavy teaching 
loads and low research budgets, but also to enhance their professional standing so 
that they may move to more prestigious schools where “their voices will be 
amplified.”47   
 Fellowship funding has also become a prominent strategy for individual 
corporations to advance their direct economic interests in the substantive direction 
of legal scholarship.  Microsoft has recently begun directly funding law 
fellowships to promote scholarship with particular content relevant to its interests 
at elite universities. The University of Michigan’s “Microsoft Fellowship in Law, 
Economics Technology” explicitly promotes intellectual property research48; 
Princeton’s Program for Law and Public Affairs hosts a similar new one-year 
funded Microsoft Fellowship;49 and the Berkeley Center for Law and Technology 
                                                 
43 TELES, supra note  2, at 174.  
44 FEDERALIST SOCIETY FOR LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY STUDIES 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 10 
[hereinafter Fed. Soc’y 2009 Ann. Rep.], available at 
http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20100416_2009AnnualReport.pdf.  See also Teles, supra note 2, at 
109-110 (counting 16 recipients).  
45 TELES, supra note 2, at 178.  
46 Eugene Volokh, Federalist Society’s Searle Young Legal Scholars Research Fellowships (blog 
posting),  The Volokh Conspiracy, June 3, 2010 http://volokh.com/2010/06/03/federalist-societys-
searle-young-legal-scholars-research-fellowships-2/ (last visited Aug. 12, 2011). 
47 Fed.  Soc’y 2009 Ann. Rep., supra note 44, at 9. 
48 See Michigan Law, Program in Law, Economics and Technology, Fellowships, 
http://www.law.umich.edu/centersandprograms/lawecontech/Pages/lawecontechfellowships.aspx 
(last visited Aug. 9, 2010). 
49 Program in Law and Public Affairs, LAPA Fellows Program, 
http://lapa.princeton.edu/fellowships.php (last visited Aug. 9, 2010).  The 2009-10 Microsoft 
fellow is the President of the European Law and Economics Association and received an Olin 
Fellowship earlier in his career, see  LAPA Fellow, Eli M. Salzberger (profile). 
http://lapa.princeton.edu/peopledetail.php?ID=615 (last visited Aug. 9, 2010).   
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hosts another recently established Microsoft research fellowship on intellectual 
property.50    
 In addition to these fellowships explicitly and directly linked to outside 
entities with particular conservative ideologies and interests, a number of elite law 
schools have used money from the Olin Foundation or other conservative donors 
to provide internal fellowships for aspiring or existing law professors for 
production of Law and Economics scholarship.  For example, the University of 
Chicago Law School has had an Olin Student Fellowship since 1984,51 along with 
additional fellowships from the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation and the 
Bradley Foundation.52 Many of the law students who received scholarships from 
the Olin Foundation    to pursue Law and Economics at elite law schools have 
gone on to become academics.53 One report counted forty-eight law faculty, 
including twenty-one at “top-ten law schools” who received Olin fellowships as 
students.54  
 With the goal of continuing the Olin Foundation’s work in Law and 
Economics (which ended in 2005), in 2008 the Kauffman Foundation launched a 
new fellowship program in six prominent law schools.55  This program provides 
up to two years of salary, with benefits and additional funds for scholarly 
expenses, to support the careers of new and aspiring scholars focusing on 
“economic innovation, entrepreneurship and economic growth.”56  Another new 
                                                 
50 See Berkeley Law, Campaign for Boalt Hall News, http://www.law.berkeley.edu/2286.htm (last 
visited July 19, 2010) (announcing the Microsoft fellowship as part of a $1 million Microsoft 
grant for research at that law school institute).   
51See The University of Chicago, The Law School, Law and Economics, Student Fellowships, 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/studentfellowships.html (last visited Aug. 12, 2011). 
52Id.  Other fellowships at law school law and economics centers do not identify the source of their 
funding, but may include outside donors with business interests.  For example, NYU Law School 
provides fellowships of $60,000 to provide one or two years of full time scholarly study and 
writing related to economic analysis of law and public choice theory. See NYU Law, Center for 
Law, Economics and Organization, Scholarship, Fellowships, and Prizes, 
http://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/laweconomics/scholarshipsfellowshipsandprizes/postgraduatefell
owships/index.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2010).  
53 Teles, supra note 2, at 109-110 (discussing Olin’s early fellowship program focusing on funding 
law degrees for PhD economists );  id. at 189-190 (discussing Olin’s student fellowships at elite 
law schools such as Yale).  
54 JOHN J. MILLER, A GIFT OF FREEDOM:  HOW THE JOHN M. OLIN FOUNDATION CHANGED 
AMERICA 77 (2006).  
55 See Kauffman Foundation, Kauffman Foundation Invests $10 Million to Cultivate Innovation-
Friendly Law, Policy, and Legal Scholarship, Dec. 11, 2008) [hereinafter Kauffman Foundation 
press release],   http://www.kauffman.org/newsroom/grant-to-cultivate-innovation-friendly-law-
policy-and-legal-scholarship.aspx (last visited Aug. 9, 2010).  
56 See, e.g., Harvard Law School,  The Kauffman Legal Fellowship 2009-2010, Post-Graduate 
Fellowship in Law, Innovation, and Economic Growth,  
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program targeting business-oriented scholarship is the Columbia Law School’s 
Charles E. Gerber Transactional Studies Program, which provides a two-year 
research fellowship designed to allow transactional lawyers to devote time to 
scholarship with the goal of moving from practice into academic careers.57   
 When fellowships are offered through university-based programs, 
conservative philanthropists likely forgo some degree of control over scholarship 
recipients’ interests and views in exchange for identification with a prestigious 
academic institution.58 Olin fellowships have undoubtedly gone to a few scholars 
using neoclassical economics to address gender inequity, such as Christine Jolls 
and Joni Hersch.  However, it seems likely that in most law schools, the Olin 
Fellows were selected and supervised by faculty without expertise or interest in 
feminist legal theory and that Olin fellowships as a whole have not been a 
significant source of support for feminist legal scholarship.59 Moreover, the direct 
involvement of nonacademic business leaders in some of the newer fellowships 
based in law schools may impede support for feminists or scholars whose work is 
perceived to undermine corporate interests.  Applicants for New York University 
Law School’s 2010-11 Kauffman Fellowship, for example, are selected by a 
committee that includes outside advisors to that school’s Jacobson Leadership 
Institute for Law and Business.60   
 Feminist legal theory has developed over the last quarter century without 
fellowship programs specifically aimed at providing time for feminist work by 
new or established legal academics.  The interdisciplinary Radcliffe Institute 
(formerly Bunting Institute) Fellowship61 has supported work on gender by a few 
                                                                                                                                     
http://www.law.harvard.edu/academics/fellowships/the-kauffman-legal-fellowship-2009-
2010.html (stating that “Kauffman Fellows will analyze the interplay between the need to maintain 
predictability under the rule of law, and the need to foster innovation, entrepreneurship, and 
economic growth”) (last visited Aug. 12, 2011); see also 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/studentfellowships.html  (University of Chicago Law  
School fellowship) (last visited Aug. 12, 2011); 
http://www.law.nyu.edu/leadershipprogram/kauffmanfellowship/howtoapply/index.htm (NYU  
Law School fellowship) (last visited Aug. 12, 2011). 
57 Columbia Law School, Research Fellowship, 
http://www.law.columbia.edu/center_program/deals/resources (last visited Aug. 9, 2010). 
58 See TELES, supra note 2, at 204-05 (discussing how the Olin Foundation’s support for Law and 
Economics shifted elite law schools’ culture to the right despite some diffusion of ideological 
fervor). 
59 One notable exception is Yale Law Professor and feminist scholar Reva Siegel, who received an 
Olin fellowship as a Yale student but whose work is not affiliated with Law and Economics, 
perhaps suggesting the relatively liberal or independent nature of Yale’s program.  Id. at 190.  
60 NYU Law, Jacobson Leadership Program in Law and Business, Apply for the Kauffman 
Fellowship,  
http://www.law.nyu.edu/leadershipprogram/kauffmanfellowship/howtoapply/index.htm 
(last visited Aug. 9, 2010). 
61 Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study,  Fellowship Program,  
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prominent legal scholars (including Elizabeth Warren and Lucinda Finley), but it 
does not target scholarship in law.  Recently, the Feminism and Legal Theory 
Project’s Visiting Scholar Program at Emory Law School directed by Martha 
Fineman has provided non-funded short term residency programs for research and 
career development by feminist legal scholars.62  
 Two newly established opportunities stand out as the rare and perhaps 
only sources of paid research for extended time on scholarship related to feminist 
legal theory.   Beginning in 2010, the Center for Reproductive Rights is 
sponsoring a two-year fellowship (in conjunction with Columbia Law School) for 
aspiring law professors specializing in reproductive rights and human rights 
(paying $55,000 a year).63   The Williams Institute of UCLA School of Law 
(established in 2002) also has provided a one-year teaching fellowship for 
aspiring academics focusing on sexual orientation law, and has recently added a 
fellowship for public policy research on sexual orientation.64  Though 
Georgetown University Law Center’s longstanding Women’s Law and Policy 
Fellowship Program also has helped produce many aspiring feminist legal leaders, 
its focus is primarily on advocacy work rather than on legal theory and 
scholarship.65     
 Many feminist scholars have nonetheless launched their careers with 
substantial help from general paid fellowships offered by individual law schools, 
such as the University of Chicago’s Bigelow Fellows program.66 Leadership and 
mentoring from senior feminist faculty has sometimes helped make some of these 
general fellowship programs especially fertile ground for feminist scholars.  For 
example, Columbia University Law School’s Associates in Law program attracted 
a number of aspiring feminist scholars (including myself) when Martha 
Fineman’s Feminism in Legal Theory Project was based at that institution.   
Positions targeted to advancing scholars of color, such as Wisconsin’s William H. 
                                                                                                                                     
http://www.radcliffe.edu/fellowship_program.aspx (last visited Aug. 9, 2010).  
62 Emory Law, Feminism and Legal Theory Project, Visiting Scholars Program,  
http://www.law.emory.edu/academics/academic-programs/feminism-legal-theory/visiting-scholar-
program.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2010). 
63Center for Reproductive Rights-Columbia Fellowship Application, Center for Reproductive 
Rights, 
http://reproductiverights.org/en/document/center-for-reproductive-rights-columbia-fellowship-
application-0 (fellowship for 2012-14) (last visited Aug. 12, 2011).  
64 See The Williams Institute, Sexual Orientation Law Teaching Fellowship,  
http://www3.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/Fellowships/TeachingFellow.html 
http://www.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/pdf/TeachingFellowshipAnn2011.pdf (last visited Aug. 
9, 2010). 
65 See Georgetown Law, Women’s Law and Public Policy Fellowship Program, 
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/wlppfp/USProgram/index.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2010). 
66 Harry A. Bigelow Teaching Fellowships, http://www.law.uchicago.edu/bigelow/apply (last 
visited Aug. 12, 2011). 
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Hastie Fellowship program,67 have also produced a number of graduates who 
have been influential in feminist legal theory. Despite the benefits of these general 
fellowships to feminist scholars, the more targeted fellowship programs have the 
advantages of creating a supportive institutional setting likely to be relatively 
insulated from institutional change and from changes in individual faculty 
availability. Targeted fellowships also can more systematically and effectively 
connect fellows to a ready-made pipeline of specialized outside resources, 
scholars and opportunities.    
 
 B.  Funding for Individual Participation in Scholarly Events 
 
Feminist scholars are also disadvantaged by highly unequal access to direct 
support for individual faculty involvement in scholarly events.  Conferences and 
workshops provide valuable opportunities for learning about theoretical 
developments, getting feedback shaping ideas and conclusions, and cultivating 
references and reviews for tenure and other job opportunities as well as citations 
to scholarship.  Many academic events require law faculty to pay their own way, 
while some provide reimbursement for travel expenses for invited speakers in 
particular, and a much smaller number provide honoraria on top of expense 
reimbursement.  In this context, targeted funding to individual scholars for their 
participation in scholarly events is likely to have an impact on faculty choices 
about which scholarly interests to pursue and on whose ideas and work gains 
substantial attention and influence.  
 The Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth at 
Northwestern University School of Law (focused on studying the impact of 
regulation on business) has been particularly generous in paying scholars for 
conference attendance and papers.  For example, a 2008 call for papers for a 
“Research Symposium on Insurance Markets and Regulation” offered law faculty 
participants a $6,000 honorarium on top of travel expenses, plus an additional 
$1,000 for publication in a law review symposium.68   More recently, a Searle 
Center event offered a $1,200 honorarium to law faculty participants, from which 
they were expected to cover travel expenses.69  In the 1970s, the Olin Foundation 
“invested” heavily in Henry Manne’s Economics Institute for Law Professors, 
which funded law professors’ expenses to attend intensive summer seminars 
                                                 
67 University of Wisconsin Law School, William H. Hastie Fellowship Program, 
http://www.law.wisc.edu/grad/fellow_hastie.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2010). 
68 Call for Papers, Research Symposium on Insurance Markets and Regulation, The Searle Center 
at Northwestern University School of Law, April 14 & 15, 2008 (on file with author). 
69Call for Papers, Searle Center –Third Annual Research Symposium on the Economics and Law 
of the Entrepreneur, http://www.ssrn.com/update/lsn/lsnann/ann10002.html (inviting papers for 
2010 conference held at Northwestern School of Law) (last visited Aug. 12, 2011). 
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(initially lasting several weeks) promoting conservative economic ideas.70  Over 
several decades since that time, numerous law school centers on Law and 
Economics have provided funding for conferences or workshops, and presumably 
this support has included substantial funding for individual faculty expenses as 
well as some honoraria.    
 Funding for participation in feminist scholarly events is far more limited, 
depending mainly on general university support and individual faculty resources.  
During times when general law school funding for faculty conference travel is 
squeezed by tight budgets, disparities in funding for involvement in scholarly 
events is likely to have particular impact on the direction and tenor of scholarship.  
Martha Fineman’s Feminism and Legal Theory Project, now at Emory University, 
stands out for its longstanding, regular support of scholarly workshops and other 
events building feminist legal theory, but this project generally depends on 
participants to fund their own travel expenses.  Similarly, LatCrit, along with the 
Society of American Law Teachers, has a well developed annual workshop for 
junior faculty to cultivate scholarship on race, gender, and sexuality but generally 
requires that participating faculty obtain support from their own travel budgets or 
salaries.71   
 
III.   Money for Scholarly Institutions 
 
Funding for scholarly institutions can influence legal theory more broadly and 
deeply than direct funding for individual scholars’ work product, time or 
conference participation. Although many law schools have a number of research 
centers focused on a variety of subjects, these rarely have the resources and range 
of programming typical of Law and Economics centers.  Furthermore, although 
law schools typically host numerous organizations that provide extracurricular 
educational and scholarly activities on a variety of subjects, the Federalist Society 
overshadows other groups in its extensive resources and national presence.  Even 
when law schools support individual faculty members’ work in feminist legal 
theory, the relative lack of institutional centers to specifically support this work 
locates feminism at the margins of most of U.S. law schools. 
 
 
   
 
                                                 
70 MILLER, supra note 54, at 66; TELES, supra note 2, at 104-08 (discussing the early years of the 
Institute).  
71 See LatCrit:  Latina and Latino Critical Legal Theory, Inc., LatCrit/SALT Junior Faculty 
Development Workshop,  
http://web2.uconn.edu/latcrit/juniorfacultydevwork.php (last visited Aug. 12, 2011). 
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 A.  The Olin Foundation:  Institutionalizing Law and Economics  
 
The John M. Olin Foundation’s funding for Law and Economics from the mid-
1970s through 2005 is perhaps the consummate example of how the flow of 
money into academia can have diffuse but substantial impact on legal ideas.  A 
sympathetic study of the Olin Foundation identified its “heavy investment” in that 
approach as perhaps the Foundation’s most significant project, noting that the 
total value of that organization’s grants for Law and Economics totaled over $68 
million.72 In an earlier (but much more meager) example of philanthropic support 
that shaped legal theory, the Russell Sage Foundation provided roughly $5 million 
dollars from 1961-1976 to promote the social sciences in legal scholarship, 
helping to initiate the Law and Society movement.73 That movement was also 
aided by a related grant program for law and social science in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s by the National Science Foundation (NSF).74 Despite the importance 
of NSF funding for the Law and Society movement, legal scholars largely have 
remained a marginal part of NSF funding, and the NSF support has had little 
institutional impact on legal academia.75 Analyzing the effect of the Russell Sage 
funding, John Henry Schlegel concludes that although it helped shape the interests 
of “a surprising number” of Law and Society scholars, it shaped the long term 
institutional culture of only one law school (Wisconsin).76   
 
                                                 
72 MILLER, supra note 54, at 62. 
73 JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM & EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 248-49 
(1995) (listing a grant of $600,000 to the University of Wisconsin; $465,000 to Northwestern, 
$765,000 to a number of schools, followed by a later period of about $3 million for residencies to 
promote interdisciplinary training by law scholars).  
74 Id. at 251. 
75 Id. at 252. 
76 Id. at 251.  Some of the scholars initially funded by Sage or the National Science Foundation 
probably did indirectly contribute to an institutional focus on Law and Society later in the 1970s at 
other law schools.  For example, the University at Buffalo’s hiring of Marc Galanter, who received 
funding from the National Science Foundation, contributed to a growing focus of law and social 
science at that school in the 1970s, but  Buffalo as an institution did not receive any systematic 
outside funding for this focus.  Conversation with Professor John Henry Schlegel, June 17, 2010.  
Nonetheless,  the faculty interest in such work contributed to the 1978 establishment of an 
endowed institutional program for such research from an individual alumni bequest, the Baldy 
Center for Law and  Social Policy. See The Baldy Center for Law and Public Policy, 
http://www.law.buffalo.edu/baldycenter/about.htm#history (last visited Aug. 9, 2010).  Law and 
development research in the 1960s and early 1970s is another example of funding for law 
scholarship  that indirectly fueled left-leaning critiques but that lacked institutional longevity.  See 
Richard Bilder & Brian C. Tamanaha, Book Review and Note, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 470, 473-75 
(1995) (discussing  LAW AND DEVELOPMENT, VOL. 2, LAW AND CULTURES  (Anthony Carty ed., 
1992), and LAW AND CRISIS IN THE THIRD WORLD ( Sammy Adelman and Abdul Paliwala, ed., 
1993)).  
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       1.  Political intent and impact of law and economics centers 
 
Olin Foundation’s funding stands out among other funding initiatives not just for 
the far greater amount of money it provided, but also for its wide-ranging impact 
on numerous legal institutions.  Beginning in the mid 1980s, the Olin Foundation 
launched a major effort to reshape legal academia, expanding its investments far 
beyond its initial focus on individual fellowships, law faculty seminars, and 
conservative think tanks.77  Over the next two decades, Olin’s funding was 
designed to institutionalize Law and Economics as a central, enduring feature of 
elite law schools.78   For example, in the late 1990s, the foundation gave $6 
million to Harvard; $1.9 million to Yale Law School, and $2.5 million to the 
University of Chicago to enhance Olin centers for Law and Economics at those 
schools.79  Following these grants with even larger donations, in 2003 the 
Foundation gave $10 million to Harvard’s Law and Economics program, one of 
the largest single grants in that wealthy school’s history.80  Also in 2003, Olin 
gave a million dollars or more to several other elite law schools, along with six-
figure donations to Chicago, Columbia, Georgetown, George Mason, 
Northwestern, University of Southern California, the University of California at 
Berkeley, and Cornell.81  After the Olin funding terminated in 2005 (a strategy 
designed to preserve tight ideological control),82 other funders with conservative 
interests have stepped in to continue support for the Olin funded programs and to 
build new institutional centers with similar ideologies.  For example, the 
Kauffman Foundation announced a $10 million “investment” in Law, Innovation 
and Growth in late 2008.83  Microsoft recently has targeted not only individual 
faculty fellowships but also broader support for law school programs on 
technology, such as its one million dollar gift to the Berkeley Center for Law and 
Technology for a “unique partnership” between the company and the law school, 
including sponsoring two faculty research projects and organizing discussions 
between faculty and Microsoft experts.84  
                                                 
77 TELES, supra note 2, at 187-88. 
78 TELES, supra note 2, at 188-190; 200. 
79 Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, 
Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 273-74 (2003).  
80 See Olin Gift Expands Law & Economics at HLS, Harvard Law Bulletin, Summer 1998, 
available at    http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/bulletin/backissues/summer98/article7.html. (last 
visited August 12, 2011). 
81 See Martha T. McCluskey, Thinking with Wolves:  Left Legal Theory After the Right’s Rise, 54 
BUFF. L. REV. 1191, 1231 & n.188 (2007) (citing 2006 Olin Foundation web site posting).  
82 MILLER, supra note 54, at 196-201(explaining Olin’s plan to limit the fund to the lifetimes of 
his appointed trustees to ensure strictly adherence to his ideological mission).  
83 See Kauffman Foundation press release, supra  note 55. 
84 See Berkeley Law, Campaign for Boalt Hall News,  supra note 50.  In response to criticism of 
Microsoft’s funding of the Google Book Settlement Project of New York Law School’s Institute 
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 The Olin initiative in Law and Economics also stands out among outside 
funders of law schools for its explicit (though often strategically couched) 
purpose of advancing a conservative political movement.85  The Olin Foundation 
consciously adopted this distinctively ideological and instrumental approach to 
philanthropy when its founder, the chemical industry executive John M. Olin, 
became outraged at militant student protests demanding African American studies 
at his alma mater, Cornell University, during the late 1960s.86  Olin then decided 
to channel his ample resources away from general university donations to instead 
actively target and produce scholars and activists promoting free market 
capitalism against what he saw as the threat of socialism and other egalitarian 
movements.87 His foundation was designed as a response to a “call to arms” in 
defense of “capitalism.”88  The Olin Foundation’s goal was not to promote 
economics as an intellectual discipline but to advance a conservative business-
oriented ideology.89  Executive Director Piereson explained that the Foundation 
focused on Law and Economics because “it seems neutral but isn’t in fact,” 
maintaining a “philosophical thrust in the direction of free markets and limited 
government.” 90  Piereson also noted the Foundation’s investment choice was 
based on recognizing that law school deans would be likely to reject funding for 
conservative approaches to constitutional law, but would be more open to the idea 
of Law and Economics.91  The Olin Foundation also embraced Law and 
Economics because of its potential as a new and far-reaching approach that could 
take attention and interest away from more left-leaning theoretical approaches 
such as critical legal theory.92    
 Continuing this approach, the recent funders of Law and Economics 
similarly appear to see their mission as fundamentally political rather than 
academic.  The benefactor of Northwestern’s Searle Center embraced the Olin 
model, designing his major philanthropic project to similarly maintain a strongly 
conservative political focus with the goal of reducing government regulation of 
                                                                                                                                     
for Law and Information Policy (headed by a former Microsoft employee) on the grounds that 
Google is a leading competitor, a company lawyer explained that this funding is simply one of a 
series of grants  to legal academics and that the company does not control the outcome of research 
funded under such grants.   Steven Levy, Who’s Messing with the Google Book Settlement?  Hint: 
They’re in Redmond, Washington, Wired, March 31, 2009, available at  
http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2009/03/whos-messing-wi/ (last visited June 24, 2010). 
85 TELES, supra note 2, at 188.  
86 MILLER, supra note  54,  at 31.  
87 Id.at 32-33.  
88 James Piereson, Opinion, You Get What You Pay For, WALL ST. J., July 21, 2004 at A10.  
89 TELES, supra note 2, at  187-191, 199. 
90Id. at 189. 
91 Id. at 188-189; MILLER, supra note 54, at 81 (explaining that in contrast to the subjectivity of 
constitutional  law, “law and economics is seen as a more objective discipline”).  
92 TELES, supra note  2, at 199. 
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business.93 In contrast, while funding from the Russell Sage Foundation and the 
National Science Foundation contributed to Law and Society scholarship that 
often had liberal-leaning political implications, the primary focus and practice of 
these programs was academic, driven by an overarching vision of neutral social 
science rather than overt political or ideological advocacy.  
 Olin’s Law and Economics initiative was carefully structured to ensure the 
long run impact of its original conservative intent.  Adopting a “venture 
capitalist” model of philanthropy, the Olin Foundation’s staff and trustees actively 
monitored and adjusted Law and Economics “investments” to ensure 
“productive” results consistent with the Foundation’s conservative agenda.94  By 
providing not just individual grants but a series of major gifts to specific law 
schools, and by closely reviewing the political implications and impact of each 
gift in the series, the Foundation maintained pressure against straying too far from 
the Foundation’s political goals.  For example, the Olin Foundation withdrew 
funding from Duke University Law School’s John M. Olin Program in Law and 
Economics after law faculty director Jerome M. Culp criticized what he saw as 
“white supremacy” in law.95  In his discussion of Olin’s conservative influence on 
law schools, Teles describes how Foundation staff reviewing a proposed Olin 
grant for Georgetown negatively weighed the law school’s attempt to discipline a 
student for revealing some data on admissions criteria for minority law students.96    
 This ideological control has not meant Law and Economics centers 
operate in lockstep with their funders or with each other.  But while some centers 
have become known for focusing on developing exceptions or modifications to 
neoclassical economics (like behavioral economics) these represent only a small 
slice of the full range of economic thought.  Despite occasional exceptions, work 
on gender remains largely absent from Law and Economics programs, and no 
center has emerged as a leader in scholarship on race, gender, labor, consumer 
protection, social insurance, or poverty (and, as mentioned above, the Olin 
Foundation blocked one director’s attempt to focus on racial inequality). 
Consistent with funders’ intent, scholarship supported by existing Law and 
Economics centers has been overwhelmingly sympathetic to or compatible with 
free-market ideology, providing just enough variation, debate and diversity in 
policy positions to also uphold the funders’ goal of constructing this ideological 
vision as a neutral or even scientific academic enterprise.   
                                                 
93 See John J. Miller, Daniel C. Searle, R.I.P., NATIONAL REVIEW, Nov. 8, 2007; Kim Dennis, 
Commentary, Daniel C. Searle, 1926-2007, PHILANTHROPY MAGAZINE, 35 (Jan.-Feb. 2008). 
94 TELES, supra note   2, at 187. 
95 MILLER, supra note 54, at 80.  Miller asserts the withdrawal of funding was not directly 
connected to these words but that Culp’s views on race were “the symptom of a larger problem” 
and that the foundation was disappointed in Culp’s “racial politics.” Id.  
96 TELES, supra note 2, at 203. 
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 Furthermore, U.S. legal scholars affiliated with Law and Economics 
centers appear overwhelmingly white and male.97 For example, George Mason’s 
Law and Economics Center lists a number of programs featuring exclusively male 
speakers or experts,98 and no women on a list of experts for its Searle Civil Justice 
Institute.99  Also in 2010, Columbia’s Center for Law and Economics Studies lists 
two women out of twenty-three affiliated faculty100; Harvard’s John M. Olin 
Center lists one woman out of seventeen closely affiliated faculty101; Chicago’s 
Law and Economics program lists three woman out of twenty-five affiliated 
faculty;102 Stanford’s John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics center lists 
one woman out of fourteen affiliated faculty103; and Yale Law School’s John M. 
Olin center lists three women out of sixteen faculty concentrating in Law and 
Economics.104  Although gender identity should not be taken as a direct reflection 
of scholarly ideology or interest, lack of gender diversity in workplaces and 
educational institutions is likely to foster harmful gender stereotypes due to 
implicit cognitive bias, as Christine Jolls and Cass Sunstein have analyzed.105  
This underrepresentation risks fostering an academic climate prejudiced against 
                                                 
97One legal scholar  elaborated  on this general perception by quipping that the Law and 
Economics movement has produced a “a generation of Smart White Guys wielding terms like 
“Pareto optimality” who were uninterested in history, culture, subordination, sociology, 
psychology, and anything having to do with “distribution.” See, e.g., Angela Harris, Reality-Based 
Economics, Posting on SALT Blog, May 20,2010,  
http://www.saltlaw.org/blog/2010/05/20/reality-based-law-and-economics/#more-730.  
98 See, e.g., Economics Institute for Judges (scheduled for September 2011), 
http://www.masonlec.org/events/economics-institute-for-judges-september (last visited Aug. 12, 
2011) (6 male speakers); “EconFest for Judges!” (scheduled for October 2011) (16 male speakers) 
http://www.masonlec.org/econfest-for-judges-2/ (last visited Aug. 12, 2011).  
99 http://www.masonlec.org/program/searle-civil-justice-institute/experts/ (listing 8 affiliated 
experts) (last visited Aug. 12, 2011). 
100 Columbia Law School, Center for Law and Economic Studies:  Affiliated Faculty,  
http://www.law.columbia.edu/center_program/law_economics/affiliated_fac (last visited June 25, 
2010). 
101 Harvard Law School, The John M. Olin Center:  Faculty,  
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/faculty/ (visited July 19, 2010).  
102 The University of Chicago, The Law School,  The John M. Olin Program in Law and 
Economics, Faculty,  http://www.law.uchicago.edu/node/984 (last visited Aug. 9, 2010). 
103 SLS, John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,  
http://www.law.stanford.edu/program/centers/opile/#faculty (last visited Aug. 9, 2010). 
104 Yale Law School, Administrative Law and Public Policy Faculty  
http://www.law.yale.edu/academics/adminlawfaculty.htm (listing faculty also described as Law 
and Economics faculty) (last visited Aug. 9, 2010). 
105 Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969, 981-982 
(2006) (summarizing social science research).  See also Stephen Benard, In Paik, & Shelley J. 
Correll, Cognitive Bias and the Motherhood Penalty, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1359, 1363 (2008) 
(summarizing status characteristics theory explaining how cognitive bias linked to race or gender 
identity leads to unequal performance evaluations). 
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feminist scholars or feminist scholarship, particularly in the context of the 
institutional pervasiveness, prominence, and superior funding for Law and 
Economics centers, combined with their ideological tendency to promote the idea 
that market success or failure normally reflects merit.  It is doubtful that this 
underrepresentation is a simple result of lack of women or feminists with interest 
in economic policy and theory, thought it is likely a product of ideological bias 
against feminism as well as gender bias.  When law schools hire faculty to 
support their Law and Economics programs, for example, they do not appear to 
have tapped into the well-established pool of feminist economists, where they 
might find (for instance) scholars like Nancy Folbre  (MacArthur “genius grant” 
winner writing on welfare, family, and education policy) to balance out 
perspectives of economists whose work focuses primarily on the legal interests of 
corporations.  
 The conservative economic ideology, lack of overt gender focus, and 
overwhelmingly white and male identity in Olin-spawned Law and Economics 
programs have negative effects beyond simply bypassing feminist scholarship.  In 
addition, these institutional centers also tend to undermine feminist legal 
scholarship, despite occasional convergences and despite a tendency toward 
agnostic or even accepting attitudes toward feminism in the abstract.   
 First, the Law and Economics movement has helped to define overall 
societal welfare in terms of economic growth presumptively inconsistent with 
government action focused on promoting equality, leading to the view that most 
law reforms directed at gender equality are suspect,  exceptional, or even anti-
intellectual.  This general presumption has reached far beyond faculty specializing 
in commercial law or technical economic analysis.  For example, a criminal law 
scholar, who graduated from law school after Law and Economics had become 
well established, explained in a 2008 blog discussion of “social justice” that the 
term refers to a preference for promoting “equitable distribution of wealth” over 
“maximum growth of wealth.”106  He then noted that “Any mature person realizes 
that those are both laudable goals that cannot, unfortunately, be simultaneously 
realized.”107  Although this framework creates a “laudable” place for preferring 
gender equity, that place is constructed as a costly and partial special interest, 
given the corresponding definition that a preference for economic growth 
produces universally beneficial and ultimately more cost-effective results in the 
long run.  Furthermore, this informal comment suggests how the Law and 
Economics framework constructs much of feminist scholarship as intellectually 
inferior to the extent it is ambitious:  the more scholars present gender equity as 
beneficial to the long run welfare of society as a whole, not just the temporary 
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special interests of a few, the more it appears immature.108  A study of the impact 
on first year law students of faculty emphasizing economic approaches rather than 
“humanist” or “critical legal” perspectives found that economic approaches led 
students to be more selfish and to define fairness in terms of cost-benefit 
calculations of “efficiency” rather than equity.109   
 Second, the Law and Economics movement has undermined legal 
feminism despite appearing to sidestep it because – as its funders intended -- it 
has provided seemingly scientific cover for a broader conservative cultural agenda 
opposed to gender equality.  Law school institutions and faculty focused on legal 
economics tend to be be associated with libertarian perspectives that are skeptical 
or even hostile to the overt moral conservativism that more openly opposes 
feminist legal views.  However, cultural conservativism often has been advanced 
by more technical economic arguments against government-funded social welfare 
programs and government regulation of business.  Indeed, the Olin Foundation 
designed its funding to further this two-pronged attack on feminism (and other 
egalitarian movements), consistent with its leaders’ purpose of directing corporate 
profits to “non-egalitarian scholars and writers.”110  In the early 1980s, after a 
period of strategic planning, Olin Foundation leaders concluded that free-market 
ideology and policy is dependent on conservative morality and culture.111  
Alongside its Law and Economics initiative, the Olin Foundation devoted major 
funding efforts to scholars and institutions specializing in overt attacks on 
feminism and feminist law reforms.  For example, the Olin Foundation has 
supported individual critics of feminism such as Christina Hoff Sommers, author 
of Who Stole Feminism? How Women have Betrayed Women (1994) and 
                                                 
108 Commenting on the success of Law and Economics, former Olin Fellow and George Mason 
law faculty member David Bernstein notes that it has changed the frame so that any discussion of 
public interest in the law is likely to be confronted by an economic (public choice) critique about 
the underlying problematic special interests.  David Bernstein, The Influence of the Olin Programs 
in Law and Economics and Otherwise, Posting to the Volokh Conspiracy, Feb. 26, 2008 9:11 am 
(discussing TELES, supra note 2), 
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2008_02_24-2008_03_01.shtml#1204019661.  However, by 
distinguishing “efficiency” from other socially beneficial goals, the Law and Economics frame 
tends to insulate certain (usually conservative) policy positions from such critiques.  See 
McCluskey, supra note  81, at 1246-47; Martha T. McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship:  
Challenging the Neoliberal Attack on the Welfare State, 78 IND. L.J. 783, 786-89 (2003) 
(explaining and critiquing this framework). 
109 Raymond Fisman, Shachar Kariv, and Daniel Markovits, Exposure to Ideology and 
Distributional Preferences,  (July 19, 2009), available at  
http://emlab.berkeley.edu/~kariv/FKM_II.pdf.   
110 William E. Simon, the Foundation’s longtime director, argued that corporate profits should 
“rush by the multimillions” to provide intellectual refuges for non-egalitarian scholars and writers. 
WILLIAM E. SIMON, A TIME FOR TRUTH 231 (1978).  
111 MILLER, supra note 54, at 104, 114-15. 
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conservative cultural advocacy groups such as the Independent Women’s Forum 
and the Center for the Study of Popular Culture.112 Although legal scholarship has 
not been the primary focus of this explicitly anti-feminist initiative, legal scholars’ 
more “objective” and technical economic arguments against feminist law reforms 
likely have had more resonance and credibility in a cultural context inflamed by 
Olin-funded direct attacks on feminism.  
 
       2.   Benefits of institutionalizing law and economics 
  
The Olin Foundation’s funding of Law and Economics has had a major impact on 
legal theory not just because of its size, scope and political focus, but also because 
it was designed to go beyond individualized support to focus on building 
specialized academic institutions.  By institutionalizing its ideological vision in 
law schools, the Olin Foundation provided a wide range of resources to scholars 
likely to advance its goals.  Consider the 2010 description of Harvard Law 
School’s John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business.  
 
The purpose of the center, which is supported by a grant from the 
John M. Olin Foundation, is to further student understanding of 
law and economics, promote faculty research in the area, and help 
make the bar and the public better aware of the economic 
approach. The center supports a variety of activities including 
fellowships for students at Harvard Law School, research 
assistantships, prizes for the best student papers in law and 
economics, a seminar series in which invited speakers present 
works in progress to students and interested faculty, curriculum 
development, conferences, empirical and theoretical research, and 
the Harvard Law School Discussion Papers in Law and 
Economics. The center also includes a special-purpose program, 
the Program on Corporate Governance.113  
 
 In early 2010, this Center’s web site listed seventeen affiliated Harvard 
Law School faculty, and reported thirty-four scholarly papers in its 2009 “faculty 
discussion” series, as well as a dozen more in a “fellows’ discussion papers” 
series for 2009; about fifteen course offerings, a previous Law and Economics 
                                                 
112 Jennifer L. Pozner, Rally ‘Round the Boys, FAIR (Freedom and Accuracy in Reporting) News, 
Sept./Oct. 1999. 
113 Harvard Law School, The John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business, 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/  (last visited March 4, 2010).  
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Seminar bringing in weekly outside speakers such as Sunstein and Posner for 
presentations and discussions with faculty and students.114   
 Stanford Law School’s John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics 
notes on its home page self-description that it “plays a very active role in the Law 
School—and more generally in the university—in promoting interest in the law 
and economics movement.”115 That program lists 15 affiliated law faculty, and 
boasts that, since its inception, it has had 75 distinguished scholars presenting to 
the monthly Law and Economics Seminar, and 257 working papers distributed 
through the Olin Program Working paper series.116  The John M. Olin Program in 
Law and Economics at the University of Chicago Law School listed twenty-five 
affiliated faculty in 2010,117 and also notes that it produces two journals, a 
working paper series, a workshop series featuring several presentations a month 
by outside scholars, a lecture series, and several conferences a year.118  The Searle 
Center on Law, Regulation and Economic Growth reports that over 1,200 
scholars, judges, and others attended its programs in 2008-09. 119  
 These lavishly funded Law and Economics centers have shaped the 
substance of legal theory, first, by systematically educating faculty in one 
paradigm, encouraging and training them to adopt and develop specific 
assumptions, methods, and interests and to focus attention on problems 
particularly salient to conservative or free-market economic interests and 
ideologies.   
 These Centers have ensured that new law faculty could become conversant 
with Law and Economics with minimal individual effort, and that they could take 
advantage of mentoring opportunities not otherwise available.120  Unlike scholars 
                                                 
114See id. (visited March 4, 2010).  
115 SLS, John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, 
http://www.law.stanford.edu/program/centers/opile/ (last visited Aug. 9, 2010). 
116 SLS, John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Recorded & Past Events,  
http://www.law.stanford.edu/program/centers/opile/#recorded_past_events (last visited Aug. 9, 
2010). 
117 See The University of Chicago, The Law School,  The John M. Olin Program in Law and 
Economics, Faculty supra note 101. 
118 http://www.law.uchicago.edu/lawecon/events/conferences (last visited Aug. 9, 2010);  
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/lawecon/events (last visited Aug. 9, 2010). 
119 Geoffrey J. Lysaught, Senior Director Policy, Research, and Communications and Chief of 
Staff, introduction to the Searle Center (video),  
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter/about-us/ (visited June 23, 2010).  In June 2010 the 
executive director and senior staff of the Searle Center moved to George Mason Law School.  
David Bernstein, Searle Center Directors and Programs Move from Northwestern to George 
Mason, Posting to the Volokh Conspiracy, June 2, 2010, http://volokh.com/2010/06/03/searle-
center-moves-from-northwestern-to-george-mason/.  
120 See TELES,  supra note 2, at  107 (interview with Yale Law Professor Michael Graetz, 
explaining how early law and economics seminars reduced the “transaction costs” of becoming 
competent readers and producers of law and economics scholarship).  
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in other disciplines, law faculty typically do not begin their careers after long 
periods of graduate study under leading legal scholars, making on-the-job 
mentoring particularly important. 
 Second, these institutions likely have encouraged individual faculty 
interest in economic analysis by providing funding for attractive social and 
emotional benefits such as generous food and drink at workshops.  By creating 
and supporting a comfortable community of faculty discussing similar ideas and 
topics, these centers provide support and recognition for faculty to take positions 
that might otherwise be construed as uninteresting, simplistic, radical, or 
offensive. Sunstein explains that scholars are more likely to take “extreme” 
positions after discussions in groups of like-minded colleagues than as individuals 
or in contexts of diffuse and diverse views.121   Henry Manne, whose faculty 
seminars in Law and Economics fueled the movement in the 1970s and early 
1980s, understood the importance of community support in scholarly 
development by requiring faculty to attend the seminars in groups of at least two 
from the same law school.122  As Law and Economics has became 
institutionalized with centers in virtually every leading law school, scholarship 
that might otherwise be considered marginal has become normalized, legitimated, 
and associated with elite professional status, as the Olin Foundation intended.  
 A third, and particularly  important way in which such institutional centers 
for Law and Economics indirectly shape legal theory is by supporting systems for 
distributing scholarship, such as working papers series, seminars, conferences, 
and prestigious peer-reviewed journals.  With increased requirements for 
scholarly production by law faculty, and numerous student law reviews 
publishing that work, legal academia is awash in writing that is rarely read or 
cited.   Centers that provide funding and staffing for circulating and publicizing 
scholarship can therefore have substantial impact on the recognition and feedback 
given to particular publications and works in progress.   For example, the Searle 
Center at Northwestern Law School emphasizes its “communication strategies” 
designed to bring its research to those who make policy as well as to scholars. Its 
Research Director and chief of staff explains the Center staff goes “to great 
lengths to ensure that our work product is distributed through a variety of 
different channels, including press conferences, policy briefings, and online 
communications.”123  Furthermore, the academic impact and prestige of these 
centers is likely enhanced by and interrelated with the concurrent funding by Olin 
and other activist conservative foundations for the Federalist Society, which has 
                                                 
121 See Sunstein, supra note  3, at 1258-60 (discussing what he calls the lesson of group 
polarization).  
122 TELES, supra note  2, at 107. 
123 Lysaught,  supra note 118. 
25
McCluskey: How Money for Legal Scholarship Disadvantages Feminism
Published by De Gruyter, 2011
 
 
extensively supported law school events and scholarly networking systems 
promoting free market ideas in legal scholarship.124    
 Finally, the institutional approach to Law and Economics funding has 
helped sustain that movement through changes in individual faculty and 
administration.  Teles describes how the Olin Foundation actively negotiated with 
law schools to ensure their programs would be well integrated into the 
institutions, rather than dependent on the interest and availability of individual 
faculty and deans.  For example, the Olin Foundation procured written assurances 
from Stanford Law School’s former Dean Kathleen Sullivan, as well as an 
agreement from that university’s president, that subsequent deans would continue 
support for the program, with the dean and faculty director also pledging to match 
a multimillion dollar Olin grant with their own fundraising.125   Similarly, in 2000, 
Olin Foundation staff reported that it had gained the assurance of Yale Law 
School’s administration that it would raise an endowment to make the Olin 
programs a permanent feature of that school after the termination of Olin 
funding.126  
 In addition, a number of law school centers have boards of non-academic 
advisors, primarily drawn from individual businesses and corporate law firms.  
The extent to which these non-academic boards have the power to influence the 
content of programming or individual funding decisions is typically obscure.  This 
lack of transparency blurs the lines between independent academic institutions 
and interest groups.   At the same time, outside boards are likely to help such 
centers avoid internal pressures for dilution or distortion of the donors’ original 
mission, such as efforts to divert funding to pet projects of Deans or faculty, or 
efforts to shift resources to a broader range of scholarly approaches or to general 
law school operating expenses.    
 Finally, funding for long-term institutionalization of Law and Economics 
has also taken the form of creating an entire law school.   The Olin Foundation 
provided George Mason Law School with “a long string of six-figure gifts”127 to 
transform into an institution specializing in Law and Economics with sharp 
control at least initially on the interests and composition of the faculty.128  
Wealthy religious conservatives similarly have founded and developed several 
law schools specializing in fundamentalist Christian legal ideas in recent years.129  
Needless to say, no law school advertises a similar focus primarily on women, 
                                                 
124 See infra Part II(B).  
125 TELES, supra note  2, at 202.  
126 TELES, supra note  2, at 190.  
127 MILLER, supra note  54 ,  at 69. 
128 TELES, supra note  2, at 209-211 
129 See McCluskey, Thinking with Wolves, supra note  80, at 1222 (discussing Regents University 
and Ave Maria School of Law). 
26




gender, or feminist ideas.  While some of these schools are relatively marginal 
within legal education, George Mason has done well in national “rankings” and 
also has successfully advanced the careers of new scholars focused on 
conservative Law and Economics.    
 
       3.  Comparison to law school programs for feminist scholarship 
 
Although feminists have organized admirable systems for distributing, 
recognizing, and recruiting legal scholarship, these efforts have received far less 
institutional and material support than the systems for distributing Law and 
Economics scholarship.   Law school centers explicitly targeting feminist legal 
scholarship are rare.   The longstanding Feminism and Legal Theory Project, now 
at Emory Law School, is one of the few law school institutions aimed at broadly 
advancing feminist legal theory.  Like the Law and Economics centers, this 
project holds regular workshops and sponsors outside speakers.  It has produced a 
number of book-length collections of feminist legal scholarship that have helped 
define the field, expand its reach, and disseminate its ideas.130    And like the Law 
and Economics centers, it has created a social and emotional community as well 
as a professional mentoring network that helps attract, encourage, and sustain 
scholarly interest.  Unlike the Law and Economics centers, however, it does not 
identify any major sustained outside funding stream and it probably commands 
far less in terms of general law school resources.   
 Another rare example of institutionalized support for feminism in law 
schools is Columbia Law School’s relatively new Center for Gender and 
Sexuality Law, which supports a wide range of events for scholars and students 
similar to Law and Economics centers, listing eleven affiliated faculty in 2010.131  
The Center works with the Columbia Journal of Gender and the Law to publish 
some scholarship from the Center’s events,132 it sponsors a new online journal 
                                                 
130  See, e.g., AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW:  FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY (Martha A. Fineman 
and Nancy Sweet Thomadsen, eds., 1990); FEMINISM, MEDIA AND THE LAW (Martha A. Fineman 
& Martha T. McCluskey, eds., 1997); FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS (Martha 
Albertson Fineman & Terence Dougherty  2005).  It also circulates drafts of workshop papers 
among participants and other interested faculty, and posts workshop programs on its web page and 
newsletter.  
131 See Columbia Law School, Center for Gender and Sexuality Law,  
http://www.law.columbia.edu/center_program/gendersexuality (last visited Aug. 9, 2010).  The 
Columbia Center advertises its program as the first and only program with this subject focus in 
U.S. law schools, which even if  not an entirely fair representation underscores the relatively 
scarce institutional presence of feminist theory or gender studies in law schools compared to  law 
and free-market economics.   
132 A 2010 symposium on the work of Judith Butler is one example. Gender and  Sexuality Law 
Blog, Columbia Law School,   
http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/genderandsexualitylawblog/files/2009/10/Butler-Flyer.pdf.  
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specifically for student scholarship;133and a blog written by its faculty directors 
includes comments on scholarship connected with the Center.134   Although 
valuable in feminist circles, these distribution systems generally lack the 
resources, prestige and visibility of the faculty-run and professionally staffed 
journals affiliated with Chicago’s Law and Economic Center, for example, or the 
professionally staffed public relations system of the Searle Center.  Furthermore, 
these existing organized efforts to circulate feminist scholarship are 
disadvantaged compared to similar efforts by Law and Economics centers, simply 
because the relatively large number of Law and Economics centers (along with 
Federalist Society programs discussed below) create a ready-made national 
audience that facilitates repeated presentations of the same paper to numerous 
elite law school faculty.    
 Feminist legal theory also has an institutionalized presence in some law 
schools through centers focusing on particular subject areas related to gender and 
law.  Nonetheless, these tend to be targeted especially to policy advocacy and to 
legal practitioners rather than to legal scholarship and theory.  For example, the 
WorkLifeLaw Center at U.C. Hastings advances research and advocacy 
particularly oriented to litigation and legislation on work and family issues.135  
Cornell Law School’s Avon Global Center for Women and Justice holds events 
and supports student research and an (unpaid) fellowship particularly aimed at 
judges and practicing lawyers.136   Finally, some law school institutes covering a 
broad range of scholarly subject areas have provided support for feminist 
research, but these general funding streams tend to be limited to occasional 
conferences or individual research projects and are not geared to long-term 
support for developing a particular strand of legal theory and practice.137   
 In contrast to Law and Economics centers, feminist programs tend to lack 
substantial staffing beyond individual law faculty, other than basic clerical 
support.  Northwestern Law School’s Searle Center, for example, has supported a 
former law professor as full-time executive director along with three other senior 
                                                 
133 Gender and Sexuality Law Online, http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/gslonline/about-2-2/.  (last 
visited June 24, 2010).  
134 Gender and Sexuality Law Blog, Columbia Law School,  
http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/genderandsexualitylawblog/. 
135 WorkLife Law, A Center of UC Hastings College of Law,  
http://www.worklifelaw.org/AboutUs.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2010).  
136 Cornell University Law School, Avon Global Center for Women and Justice at Cornell Law 
School, http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/womenandjustice/aboutus/ (last visited Aug. 9, 2010). 
137 See, e.g., the Baldy Center for Law and Social Policy, University at Buffalo Law School; the 
University of Wisconsin Law School’s Institute for Legal Studies, and Yale Law School’s Oscar 
M. Reubhausen Fund. 
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directors, each supervising a team of other staff.138  The Feminism and Legal 
Theory Project at Emory and the Columbia Center for Gender and Sexuality both 
appear to rely on one or two law faculty members to manage those programs on 
top of their general faculty responsibilities, which typically would include not just 
teaching and scholarship but general law school administrative service.  In 
general, without substantial external funding and internal staffing, institutional 
support for feminist scholarship is likely to primarily depend on the extraordinary 
volunteer efforts of individual feminist faculty likely to be already heavily 
burdened by other work and personal demands.139  
 This relative lack of specialized staffing particularly disadvantages 
dissemination of scholarship from feminist and general scholarly centers.  
Planning and running scholarly events can require substantial sacrifices in faculty 
members’ individual scholarly production or personal time. Although the internet 
has in some ways increased the possibilities for low-cost dissemination of 
scholarly ideas, maintaining blogs and websites well also takes substantial time 
and skill.  The Feminist Law Professors blog run by Ann Bartow and Bridget 
Crawford,140 and the reproductive rights blog for law professors run by Caitlin 
Borgmann,141 depend largely on uncompensated work by law faculty on top of 
their regular faculty responsibilities with little institutional support or direct 
reward.  In contrast, Northwestern’s Searle Center team of paid staff produces 
regular email reports on its sponsored scholarship and events, and develops 
multimedia presentations for distribution not only to academics but to media 
outlets.  
 Finally, law school institutions promoting feminist scholarship tend to lack 
comparable insulation from individual and institutional change.  Without ongoing 
outside funding and monitoring from ideologically focused donors and advisory 
boards, scholarly centers are likely to be highly vulnerable to the shifting interests 
and resources of law school faculty, deans and university administrations. As law 
schools in general become more dependent on attracting wealthy donors and on 
                                                 
138 Northwestern Law, Searle Center on Law, Regulation and Economic Growth, Center 
Leadership, http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter/about-us/index.cfm?ID=10 (last visited 
June 23, 2010); see also Bernstein, supra note 118  (reporting the leadership’s move to George 
Mason).  
139Adding to the relative time pressures on institutional service, feminist law faculty are probably 
less likely than other law faculty to rely on a full-time homemaking spouse or partner for their 
personal and family care needs.  See Mary Anne Case, How High the Apple Pie? A Few Troubling 
Questions About Where, Why and How the Burden of Care for Children Should be Shifted, 73 
CHI-KENT. L. REV. 1753, 1763-64 & n.30 (2001).   
 (noting that she was the only one of her school’s  five junior faculty without an at-home wife). 
140 See supra note 1. 
141 Reproductive Rights Prof Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/reproductive_rights/  (last 
visited Aug. 9, 2010). 
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promoting their reputation among prominent judges, deans or law firms, some 
may tend to decrease internal support for programs likely to appear controversial, 
radical, or peripheral to the concerns of business.  
 
 B.  The Federalist Society:  Organized Conservativism in Law Schools 
  
The Federalist Society represents a second major institutional funding initiative 
that has had major impact on U.S. legal academia and scholarship over the 
decades since its beginning in 1982 as a law student group.   The Federalist 
Society now has student chapters in every accredited U.S. law school, along with 
lawyers’ groups across the country, and (since 1999) a faculty division; together 
these groups served over twelve thousand dues-paying national members in 
2009.142  The Federalist Society’s unabashedly ideological and political purpose is 
to prioritize and restore “traditional values” and “individual liberty” through “a 
conservative and libertarian intellectual network.”143  Though this purpose may 
overlap with some forms of feminism, the group’s mission, theory, and practice 
generally works against many of the critiques and policy reforms advanced by 
feminist legal scholarship.   
 Like Law and Economics programs, the Federalist Society has reshaped 
legal theory by institutionalizing support for conservative intellectualism.  It has 
infused well over $40 million144 since the mid-1980s in building what founder and 
longtime chairman Steven Calabresi explains as a “conservative university 
without walls.”145 Far exceeding the resources of feminist or left-leaning student 
or faculty groups, leading conservative foundations helped the group amass an 
annual budget of over a million dollars within four years of its founding.146 In the 
1990s, its annual spending more than doubled and then continued to increase to 
more than seven million dollars by 2005 147 with revenue reaching ten million 
dollars in 2008.148 Underscoring the connections between Law and Economics 
and more overtly conservative ideology, the Olin Foundation developed a close 
relationship with the group’s leaders149 and gave the Federalist Society over $5.5 
                                                 
142 Fed. Soc’y 2009 Ann. Rep., supra note 44, at 36. 
143 See The Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies, About Us:  Our Purpose,  
http://www.fed-soc.org/aboutus/ (last visited Aug. 9, 2010). 
144 TELES, supra note  2, at 148, figure 5.1. 
145 TELES, supra note  2, at 164.  
146 Id. at 148; Jason DeParle, Debating the Subtle Sway of the Federalist Society,  N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 1, 2005 (crediting support from the Olin Foundation  as vital to the Federalist Society’s 
success).  
147 TELES, supra note  2, at 148. 
148 Fed. Soc’y 2009 Ann. Rep., supra note 44, at 36 (showing a slight decline to about nine million 
in 2009). 
149 TELES, supra note   2, at 151. 
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million, including support not just for its namesake fellowships but also for the 
group’s initial start-up costs and general operating expenses over several 
decades.150 
 Reaching far beyond individual fellowships, the Federalist Society (like 
the Law and Economics programs) is grounded in an understanding of community 
as the foundation of giving power to ideas.151  The longstanding and generous 
funding for law student chapters’ operation and programming has ensured that 
conservative ideas and policy positions are a familiar part of legal education at 
virtually all law schools.  Moreover, the lavish resources for student group 
organizing combined with parallel resources for organizing lawyers and judges 
has meant that conservative ideas and arguments are tied to concrete material 
rewards for students, from dinners and study materials to a jobs pipeline linked to 
leading institutions of government, the judiciary, and the private bar.152  While 
other law school organizations typically are dependent on limited general law 
school funding for outside speakers’ time and travel, the Federalist Society spends 
generously (over one and a half million dollars in 2009)153 to bring conservative 
speakers to law schools, with over 1,150 law school events in 2008-09 reaching 
over 70,000 people and highlighting several Supreme Court justices (among other 
prominent leaders).   One study attributed Harvard Law School’s rightward shift 
over the last several decades to the Federalist Society’s “veritable empire” 
shaping the political and intellectual culture of that school.154  During 2004-05, 
for example, Harvard’s Federalist Society organized fourteen events with outside 
speakers, monthly colloquia on current legal issues, eleven student-faculty 
lunches, and the Federalist Society’s annual National Student Symposium.155 In 
addition to these more scholarly events, Harvard’s student chapter in the mid-
2000s typically organized a barbeque for new students, monthly parties, a 
women’s dessert party, an alumni reception, community service activities, career 
development panels, and a system for sharing course outlines.156   The national 
organization’s ample funding also focuses on rewarding and training students to 
become chapter leaders, bringing over two hundred law students to an annual 
summer leadership session in Washington, D.C., where they not only learn skills 
                                                 
150 MILLER, supra note 54, at 93, 201. 
151 TELES, supra note   2, at 164, (quoting comments by founders and ongoing officers Steven 
Calabresi and Gary Lawson). 
152 George W. Hicks, Jr.,The Conservative Influence of the Federalist Society on the Harvard Law 
School Student Body, 29 HARV. J. OF L. & PUB. POL’Y 623, 707 (2006). 
153  Fed. Soc’y 2009 Ann. Rep., supra note 44, at 33. 
154 Hicks, supra note 151, at 707. 
155Id. at 707-08. 
156 Id. at 707-08. 
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and develop their peer networks but also enjoy social events with national leaders 
such as Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas.157  
 As the Federalist Society’s faculty brochure explains, its extensive 
resources for student events ensure a wealth of opportunities for legal scholars to 
disseminate and develop their work.158  For example, University of Pennsylvania 
Law Professor Stephanos Bibas presented a paper on originalism and formalism 
in criminal procedure to student chapters at twenty-eight different law schools.159  
Further opportunities for publicizing scholarly ideas come from the group’s well-
supported Lawyer’s Division, which spent over six hundred thousand dollars in 
2009160 to reach over 26,000 lawyers with events that often featured law 
professors.161 This division includes a special chapter for Congressional staff, 
connecting them with law faculty and other conservative legal experts for special 
educational seminars funded with help from the Heritage Foundation.162 
 In addition to tailoring services to students and the legal profession, the 
Federalist Society has accelerated its structural support for conservative legal 
theory through its Faculty Division. By scheduling the Division’s main annual 
conference in conjunction with the annual meeting of the Association for 
American Law Schools (AALS), this Division helps individual faculty 
participants save travel costs and time.   This event includes not just the usual 
scholarly panels, lectures and debates along with networking and socializing, but 
also the opportunity for feedback on individual works-in-progress as well as a 
special competition allowing selected junior faculty to have their work featured 
and reviewed by  a panel of leading scholars.163  In addition, the Faculty Division 
recently expanded its programming to feature a series of national colloquia on 
particular subject areas, a separate national conference for mentoring junior 
faculty, a national job talk workshop to groom prospective faculty members, and 
an academic career program for law students.164   
 Finally, the Federalist Society devotes extensive resources to publicizing 
individual faculty scholarship far beyond standard academic and professional 
                                                 
157 Fed. Soc’y 2009 Ann. Rep., supra note 44, at 3; see also Amy Bach, Moving on Up with the 
Federalist Society, THE NATION,  Sept. 13, 2001 (describing a first year law student drinking with 
Federal Circuit Court Judge Alex Kozinski, known for screening future clerks for Supreme Court 
Justice Kennedy). 
158 The Federalist Society Faculty Division Membership and Benefits (undated brochure on file 
with author).  
159 Curriculum vitae of Stephanos Bibos listed on University of Pennsylvania Law School web 
site,  http://www.law.upenn.edu/cf/faculty/sbibas/cv.pdf  (last visited June 23, 2010).  
160 Fed. Soc’y 2009 Ann. Rep., supra note 44, at 33. 
161Id.  at 5. 
162Id. at  8-9.  
163Id. at. 16. 
164Id. at. 10. 
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presentations and journals. A media outreach program connects faculty specialists 
to the media and to members of the public.165 As part of an extensive effort to 
“leverage technology,” the organization’s web site promptly posts scholarly 
content from its events in downloadable pdf files or in audio and video form, and 
ensures that all of its publications are available electronically; much of this 
content also goes on the organization’s YouTube and Facebook sites.166  In 
addition, the national Federalist Society supports a scholars’ database providing 
individual webpages that link to all the publications and recorded events for each 
scholar.167 The web site also distributes several special Federalist Society podcast 
series featuring commentary and debates by scholars and others.168   Furthermore, 
the Federalist Society’s publications include a White Paper series on current 
policy issues, a glossy magazine with three issues a year, an online scholarly 
journal with three issues a year, as well as several more practice-oriented 
newsletters.169 
 Nothing remotely comparable to this comprehensive scholarly 
development and distribution system has been available for feminist legal 
scholarship.  The Women in Legal Education section of the AALS is an example 
of a gender-related national scholarly organization that regularly sponsors panel 
presentations at the AALS annual meeting, along with an annual breakfast and an 
occasional newsletter listing recent publications.  However, this group has far 
narrower scope, relies on the volunteer work of individual law faculty, appears to 
command no outside resources, is not connected to students, local organizations, 
professionals or politicians, and lacks the overt and unrestrained ideological 
freedom and focus of the Federalist Society, whose leadership has remained in the 
hands of a small group of founders.170  Furthermore, the standard budget 
allocation for AALS sections is $900.171   
 More comparable is the American Constitution Society (ACS), founded in 
2001 explicitly as a liberal counterweight to the Federalist Society.  The ACS’s 
vision generally includes strong support for equality and economic regulation, and 
several influential feminist scholars have been active in the organization (such as 
Dawn Johnson and  Reva Siegel). The ACS sponsors an array of debates, panels 
and lectures through chapters at most U.S. law schools and a somewhat smaller 
network of lawyers’ chapters.  Like the Federalist Society, the ACS provides 
                                                 
165 Faculty Division Brochure, supra note 157, at  6-7.  
166 Fed. Soc’y 2009 Ann. Rep., supra note 44, at 26. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. at 25-26. 
170 TELES, supra note  2, at 161 (reporting that through mid 2000s the group has had the same full-
time president and a board of directors comprised of the original founders and early leaders). 
171 AALS Section Handbook, Attachment A Section Budget Request for FY 2010-11, available at 
http://www.aals.org/documents/sections/SectionAttachments/AttachmentA.pdf. 
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impressive social, educational, and career opportunities through a national 
conference structured to connect law faculty and students with leaders in 
government and the legal profession, and it supports a web site, journal and other 
resources to help disseminate scholarship.172  However, with a substantially 
smaller budget, it lacks the programming muscle and breadth of the Federalist 
Society.173 It offers no paid fellowships to law faculty, and lacks comparable 
structures to organize, support, and distribute legal scholarship.  It has no separate 
faculty division, no separate law faculty events or mentoring systems, and no 
specific programs for aspiring law faculty or junior scholars.   Though law faculty 
are well represented among the group’s leaders and speakers, and although the 
organization distributes a law journal and some books on constitutional 
principles,174 the annual convention and chapter activities appear to be largely 
attended by and focused on practicing professionals and policy makers.   
 Moreover, because the Federalist Society is one organization among many 
sponsored by activist conservative foundations as part of a broader strategy to 
reshape legal academia and public policy, its speakers and events are reinforced 
by an academic, legal and political culture saturated with critiques of liberal 
support for affirmative action, government health insurance, workers’ rights, 
abortion, public education, and social welfare. Although the ACS draws on the 
expertise of many liberal advocacy groups, including some focused specifically 
on women’s rights, these groups typically offer few independent resources for 
supporting or distributing scholarship.  Despite its important resources, ACS has 
not yet had comparable power to shape legal theory, legal education or the general 
public debate over law and policy.175  Similarly, other national law organizations 
that tend to be supportive of feminism, like the National Lawyers Guild or the 
American Civil Liberties Union, focus even less on law schools, law faculty, and 
legal scholarship, though these certainly have contributed to shaping the 
intellectual debate on many issues over time.  No national organization currently 
focuses specifically on promoting feminism in legal academia in the U.S.  In 
contrast, since 1974, Canadian law students, faculty, and advocates have been 
organized through the non-profit National Association of Women and the Law, 
which has successfully advanced a number of major law reforms, in addition to 
                                                 
172 American Constitution Society for Law and Policy, http://www.acslaw.org/ (last visited Aug. 9, 
2010). 
173 Lydia DePillis, Et Tu, Scalia? Dispatch from the American Constitution  Society Convention, 
SLATE, June 22, 2009 (reporting the ACS had a 2007 budget of $3 million, compared to $11 
million spent by the Federalist Society).   
174 See, e.g., GOODWIN LIU, PAMELA S. KARLAN, AND CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER, KEEPING 
FAITH WITH THE CONSTITUTION (2010). 
175 See DePillis, supra note 172  (noting that liberal and progressive leaders still discuss the 
constitution using federalist arguments, despite attempts by ACS to offer alternative principles for 
constitutional interpretation).  
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sponsoring working groups, forums, biennial national conventions, and (more 
recently) research grants for feminist scholarship.176  
 
IV.  What Can Feminists Do? 
  
The pervasive influence of interested money in legal theory challenges us to think 
about how to create and sustain academic institutions where ideas can compete -- 
and coalesce -- on a broader, deeper, and different basis than their appeal to those 
who can pay most extravagantly for intellectual legitimation.  Indeed, Steven 
Teles argues that conservative investments in legal theory have been successful in 
part by building institutions structured to foster genuine intellectual debate and 
learning insulated from immediate instrumental interests.  Despite this degree of 
openness, those institutions nonetheless have been carefully controlled to further 
particular interests over the long run, by cultivating and sharpening conservative 
ideological commitments and by redefining the standards for legal intellectualism.    
 
 A. Challenging Conservative Intellectual Neutrality 
 
The problem of nonacademic money for legal theory is not that ideas tied to 
nonacademic funding or political movements are necessarily intellectually 
suspect, or that all views deserve equal resources. Instead, the primary problem is 
that vastly unequal resources in legal academia has served to entrench 
questionable conservative premises and commitments as fundamental to 
“common sense, intellectual seriousness, responsibility, professionalism,” while 
portraying opposing ideas as “off the wall.”177  In his study of the conservative 
legal movement’s successful challenge to liberal control of legal academia over 
the last half century, Teles concludes that ideas can play a major role in both 
sustaining and reversing comprehensive political power.178  Teles underscores the 
importance of conservative funders’ long term strategy of harnessing law schools’ 
power to redefine professionalism by changing the boundaries of “the kinds of 
ideas that are held by respectable lawyers”.179   
 Feminists daunted by the barriers of vastly unequal resources can learn 
and perhaps take heart from Teles’s conclusion that a particular point of 
vulnerability for dominant regimes is precisely that ability to entrench certain 
ideas as neutral professionalism.  According to Teles, legal conservativism’s 
                                                 
176 See National Association of Women and the Law, Policy Research Grant Recipients, 
http://www.nawl.ca/en/component/content/article/461-grant-recipient-announcement (last visited 
Aug. 9, 2010). 
177 Id.  
178 TELES, supra note 2, at 266. 
179 Id. at 267-68. 
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success shows that powerful regimes remain vulnerable to the clever, committed 
and persistent activism by individual intellectual entrepreneurs.180 Henry Manne’s 
summer seminar in legal economics, Richard Posner’s sweeping Law and 
Economics textbook, and John M. Olin’s creative approach to corporate 
philanthropy have each advanced the Law and Economics movement in a 
somewhat unfavorable intellectual climate by directly and strategically 
challenging rather than accommodating the central assumptions and norms of 
liberal legal academia. 
 Teles’s analysis suggests that feminist scholarship similarly should not shy 
away from ambitious efforts to radically rethink the premises taken as neutral and 
normal in conservative and centrist law.  Furthermore, it suggests the value of 
scholarship that directly challenges claims that conservative ideas represent 
objective, uncontested, or universal truth, whether grounded in market forces and 
supposedly scientific economic priniciples, in purported constitutional originalism 
or literalism, or in evolutionary biology or divine creation.   In addition, feminists 
should confront and subject to intellectual scrutiny the presumed neutral 
professionalism of the institutional structures supporting those ideas by 
demanding more transparency about outside funding of legal scholarship.  Efforts 
to increase disclosure should extend not only to the amount and criteria of 
nonacademic funding for individual publications, but also to outside-funded 
institutions operating within law schools.  For example, we should explore 
whether academic integrity requires more complete and public disclosure of the 
identities, specific economic interests, and degree of control of outside donors and 
advisors to academic centers.181  This discussion of transparency should extend to 
scholarly events sponsored by student groups such as the Federalist Society 
chapters.    
 Ironically, feminist legal theory’s relative independence from outside 
funding can make it more likely to be marginalized as narrowly political or 
insubstantial compared to Law and Economics or even compared to many of the 
ideas associated with the Federalist Society.  Even among nonconservatives, 
feminism in law may be identified with outcome-oriented advocacy rather than 
rigorous intellectual inquiry in part because many of the institutions most closely 
and specifically associated with feminism are primarily practical and political 
rather than scholarly in focus.   
                                                 
180 Id. at 269-74. 
181 Some forms and contexts of disclosure might have costs that should be carefully considered, 
but which are beyond the scope of this essay’s narrower aim of putting the issue on the table for 
closer analysis.  See Katherine Franke, Public Shaming as the New Revolt of the Homosexual, 
Posting to Gender and Sexuality Law Blog, Nov. 1, 2009,  
http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/genderandsexualitylawblog/2009/11/01/public-shaming-as-the-new-
revolt-of-the-homosexual/ (criticizing same-sex marriage advocates’ disclosure names of persons 
supporting  California’s Proposition 8).  
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 Teles’s emphasis on conservative intellectual activists’ power to challenge 
the previously dominant liberal intellectual regime understates the extent to which 
their entrepreneurial success depended on extensive material support from 
powerful and wealthy institutions insulated against ideological change. The 
history of feminist legal theory reveals plenty of creative and energetic 
entrepreneurs who have lacked material and institutional support comparable to 
Law and Economics entrepreneurs.  Like Henry Manne in Law and Economics, 
Martha Fineman has mentored hundreds of developing legal scholars and has 
created the intellectual vision, community, and institutional framework vital to 
sustaining a scholarly movement. But unlike Manne, Fineman has not received a 
specialized law school to run or regular six-figure checks from corporate donors 
to spend on advancing feminism in legal theory.   For another example, Catharine 
MacKinnon did not secure a tenure track law faculty position until many years 
after her writings helped establish feminist jurisprudence as an exciting and far-
reaching movement.182  In contrast, before he produced his work galvanizing the 
Law and Economics movement, Richard Posner had been recruited to the law 
faculty of the University of Chicago, where the Volker Fund had already 
institutionalized a “safe space” for conservative Law and Economics through a 
network of free-market oriented faculty, fellowships and a specialized journal.183   
 The rise of legal conservativism underscores the importance for feminism 
of strategically focusing both theory and resources on building comparable 
institutions where risk-taking intellectualism can flourish, based on an 
understanding of theory as the product of organization, access to information, 
marketing and community as much as individual intelligence and initiative. 
Several institutional gaps in support for feminist legal theory offer fertile ground 
for investment of scarce resources.   
 
 B.  Strengthening Institutions for Feminist Theory 
 
First, Teles attributes conservatives’ success in legal academia to their 
development of organizations where repeated interactions over a long period 
create relationships fostering trust, commitment, and learning (both intellectual 
and institutional) among scholars and advocates.184 Fineman’s Feminism and 
                                                 
182 Frances Olsen, Feminist Theory in Grand Style (book review), 89 COLUMB. L. REV. 1147, 1149 
(1989); see also Leslie Bender,  For Mary Joe Frug:  Empowering Women Law Professors, 6 
WISC. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 6-7 (1991) (discussing gender inequality in tenured law faculty posititions 
and citing difficulties faced by several leading feminist scholars). 
183 See TELES, supra note  2, at 91-98 (discussing the establishment of law and economics at 
Chicago); 271 (summarizing how Chicago worked as an “abeyance structure” protecting and 
nurturing free market thought in a generally hostile academic environment). 
184 See TELES, supra note  2, at 272 (commenting on the value of early Law and Economics 
seminars and conferences as well as the Federalist Society).  
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Legal Theory project and the LatCrit annual meeting are examples of scholarly 
organizations that have fostered long term conversations and strong personal and 
professional connections among a group of scholars large enough to have diverse 
views and professional connections yet structured to encourage personal 
connection and shared commitment.  However, many other venues for developing 
feminist scholarship are not so conducive to sustained and strong connections, 
such as one-time events sponsored by individual law schools, or large gatherings 
of scholars with diffuse interests and approaches (like the annual meetings of the 
Law and Society and the AALS).   The conservative example suggests that 
feminist academics might benefit from concentrating resources on scholarly 
gatherings and exchanges aimed at building longer term communities and lasting 
institutions, not just individual publications. 
 Second, conservatives have understood that, over the long run, reshaping 
legal theory is a cost-effective and practical way to improve outcomes on specific 
law reform projects.  Existing national organizations providing long term support 
for feminism could go further to follow the lead of the Federalist Society and the 
Law and Economics movement in developing more institutional support for 
progressive legal theory.  For example, the ACS could target more programs and 
events focused on scholarship and on mentoring junior faculty, and it could 
expand its advocacy to address the conservative institutional pressures in legal 
academia, including issues such as rankings reforms, transparency about outside 
funding and public support for education.  The Society of American Law 
Teachers could expand its excellent programs on law teaching, academic freedom, 
and law school diversity to more specifically target development of progressive 
scholarship.  Advocacy groups focused on particular issues could follow the lead 
of the Center for Reproductive Rights to support scholarship and to build long 
term ties with feminist faculty and feminist law school programs.   
 Third, resources for feminism should be targeted to increase material 
support for the work of initiating and administering scholarly institutions. The 
relative lack of institutional and individual resources means that intellectual 
organizing work is particular costly for feminist entrepreneurs.  Rather than 
simply focusing on grants for research, a wish list for feminist philanthropy 
should include grants to support (for instance) institution-building and leadership 
development for explicitly feminist academic programs.   
 Finally, the success of conservative legal theory underscores the 
importance of building institutions for broadly disseminating scholarship not just 
to academics but to the popular media and to advocacy groups, as well as to 
political and economic leaders.  Feminist academic programs need better funding 
for professional staff and other resources to use various media to distribute 
scholarship to diverse audiences, particularly as book publishers cut back on 
marketing.  Teles notes that liberal legal ideas are particularly cut off from 
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popular discourse and from grassroots activists.185  Particularly fruitful would be 
support for a long term internet presence that could widely distribute feminist 
legal ideas and connect individual scholars, events, and publications through 
online networks and databases similar to those of the Federalist Society.  Feminist 
academic institutions should also be better structured to bridge hierarchical 
institutional divides that have often isolated legal theory from the work of the 
many excellent law school clinics involved in feminist advocacy (in poverty law, 
domestic violence, and human rights, for example).   
 Though feminist philanthropists are unlikely to match the wealth of John 
M. Olin, both small and large donors can follow his lead in targeting money and 
service to explicitly feminist and progressive rather than to general academic and 
professional programs.  The conservative example shows that intellectual and 
practical credibility and power does not come from distancing legal theory from 
ideological commitments, but instead depends on sharpening, animating, and 
above all institutionalizing strong political passions and perspectives in legal 
theory.  More than conservativism, feminist legal theory tends to be (and should 
remain) transparent about its commitments and perspectives. Increased 
nonacademic funding for openly feminist scholarly institutions will tend to 
contribute to rather than obscure and confine robust intellectual debate.  Feminist 
ideas can go further to upend the power of money and privilege in law if feminist 
scholars and advocates both harness and challenge the material foundations of 
intellectual power in law.   
 
                                                 
185 See TELES, supra note  2 , at 278 (contrasting liberal and conservative weaknesses). 
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